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The Indigent's Right To Counsel In Civil Cases
A man whose life or liberty is jeopardized by a felony charge has a
constitutional right to a lawyer.' When his property - is at stake, in a
civil case, he may have a lawyer too-but only if he can afford to hire
one.3 This gap between the rights of poor criminal defendants and poor
civil litigants was left undisturbed by the Supreme Court in October
1966, when it denied certiorari in the case of Sandoval v. Rattikin.4
Matias and Teresa Sandoval, an indigent and illiterate Texas couple,
had sought to reverse a civil judgment on the ground that the state's
failure to appoiiit counsel for them violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a trespasst9-try-title action, the Sandovals had lost the two-room
house in which they ha-lived since 1945 with their nine children. Two
weeks before thek.trial, thei lawyer withdrew because they could not
pay his fee, so they turned to the Nueces County legal aid attorney. He
spoke only English and did'no attempt to confer with his clients, who
spoke only Spanish. His perfunctory preparation did not inform him
that the "deed" on which plaintiff based his claim to the Sandovals'
land was actually a mortgage, which under Texas homestead law could
not confer title.5
As the Sandovals' plight indicates, the actual concerns of the poor do
not reflect the law's sharp distinction between civil and criminal liti-
gants. Poverty only magnifies the importance of protecting one's prop-
erty from seizure by legal process. The poor man may be evicted, his
furniture may be repossessed, his welfare payments cut off, his children
taken from him. Indeed, he may lose his liberty, through civil commit-
ment to a mental institution. Conversely, he has vital interests which he
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For the right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases, see note 28 infra.
2. This Note does not deal with the area of the "quasi.criminal" action-cases civil in
form but affecting the personal liberty of a party. F-xamples are habeas corpus, coram
nobis, juvenile court, civil commitment, probation revocation, and deportation proceed-
ings. In recent years many courts have taken the combination of Douglas v. California.
372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), to comae1 appointment of
counsel for indigents in such cases. See cases cited in Note, Thec Right to Counsel in
Civil Litigation, 66 CoLut. L. REv. 1322 n.3 (1966); People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226,
397 P.2d 993, 42 Cal. Rept. 1 (1965) (coram nobis hearing), noted in 13 U.C.L.A.L. Ray.
446 (1966); but see Flowers v. Oklahoma, 356 F.2d 916 (10 Cir. 1966).
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45, 69 (1932).
4. 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WErm 3138 (U.S. Oct. 18,
1956).
5. The facts are most fully set out in the lower court dissenting opinion, 395 S.W.2d
889, 894-901.
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can only realize as a plaintiff in a civil action. He might be able to
suspend rent payments for housing code violations, or get restitution
for fraudulent or usurious credit transactions; he could protect his
privacy and security against the arbitrary actions of welfare officials; get
a divorce or a support, separation, or custody decree; or demand a
hearing to challenge a civil commitment order.0
To meet such threats to their well-being poor people must turn to
one of three sources of counsel: the private bar, organized private legal
aid, and public legal assistance. None of these presently comes close to
meeting the needs of the indigent for legal help.7
Most private attorneys work only for fees, which effectively bar the
poor from access to their services. Private legal aid, long a major
supplier of counsel to the poor s depends upon charitable contributions
and volunteered services, and has never been able to supply more than a
fraction of the needed services. 9 Legal aid societies exist only in the
larger cities, and not in all of them;10 where they do exist, they must
set drastic standards of indigency for their clients, and still must turn
away whole classes of civil cases for lack of the lawyers to handle them."
Publicly supplied counsel may be provided as an adjunct of the right
to proceed with a civil case in forma pauperis in the federal courts, and
in the courts of a few states. 12 However, appointment of counsel under
such statutes is discretionary with the court, and in practice is grudg-
ingly granted. 13 In recent years, a different kind of public legal aid has
6. On the areas of civil litigation particularly affecting the poor, see DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL SERVICES TO TIE POOR 17.69
(1964); NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY, PROCEEDINGS 1-47 (1965); WALD, LAW
AND POVERTY 6-35, 40-42 (1965); Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice,
12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381, 390-407 (1965).
7. On the inadequacy of the present effort, see Carlin & Howard, supra note 6, at
407-21; Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROD. 211, 213-18 (1966). Cf. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., former Director of the Legal Services
Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity: "The last estimate is that existing free
legal assistance for indigents reaches only 10% of the need." Address, Southwest Regional
Conference on Legal Services to the Poor, Austin, Texas, March 25, 1966.
8. In 1964, 247 private legal aid offices handled 413,638 new civil cases at a cost of$4,357,453. NATIONAL LEGALAID AND DrFNDER ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF CONFERENMC
PROCEEDINGS (1965).
9. See sources cited supra note 7.
10. In April 1965, there were no legal aid facilities meeting the minimum requirements
of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in 130 American cities. Pye, supra
note 7, at 213.
11. Legal Aid Societies often do not handle bankruptcy and divorce cases. Carlin &
Howard, supra note 6, at 413-16.
.1 12. 27 Stat. 252 (1892), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 27-401
(1962); ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 33, § 5 (1960); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-211 (1946); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 453.190 (1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 514.040 (1952); NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACcr Aar § 196
(1955); GEN. STAT. No. CAR. § 1-110 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-201 (1955); TEX. STAT,
ANN. art. 1917 (1964); VA. CODE 14.1-183 (1964); W. VA. CODE § 5853 (1961).
13. On the federal courts' attitude, see Duniway, The Poor Man and the Federal
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emerged with the support of the Office of Economic Opportunity.1 4
Local programs supported by OEO grants are in some cases analogous
to traditional legal aid societies. In other cases they represent a new and
more aggressive approach to the legal problems of the poor. The OEO
Legal Services Program has become the most important single source of
legal assistance to the poor, but it has not yet nearly met the need.15
A constitutional mandate will spur philanthropic and legislative
agencies to provide adequate counsel for those unable to hire their own.
Such a mandate should not be long in coming.18 The doctrinal argu-
ments for a right of civil counsel are simple. Indeed, the Supreme
Court will have trouble resisting the logic of its own recent prece-
dents.17 The Court's present caution must rest less on logic than on
prudence-fear of burdening governments with an intolerable ex-
pense, and hence of causing itself unwanted political troubles. But the
economic costs of providing full legal services to the poor cannot
seriously strain the greatest industrial nation in the world. Political
resistance can be softened by a graduated advance, resting temporarily
with rules which draw the constitutional line short of an unqualified
right to counsel.
The Doctrinal Case for Appointed Civil Counsel
Due Process's
The Supreme Court tied its 1963 grant of appointed counsel for
indigent criminal defendants to the due process clause of die Four-
Courts, 18 Sr. L. REv. 1270, 1277-80; see also United States ex ref. Gardner v. Madden,
352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963); Miller v.
Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961); Reid v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1956); but see
Gift Stars, Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d
314 (9th Cir. 1963).
14. Under Title II-A of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 508, 516, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2781-91 (1964). The Legal Services Program of OEO is described in Orrice or
ECONOMIC OppoxruNITy, Jus-TcE (First Report to American Bar Association) (1966).
15. In the first eleven months of the program, between September 1965 and August
1966, OEO made 160 grants totalling over $27,000,000, and established over 500 neu,
legal service offices. However, the program left thirteen of the fifty largest American cities
without OEO supported offices. OFFICE OF EcoNo.Nuc OPPORTu Nm, op. at. supra note 14.
16. Mr. Justice Fortas, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, apparently thinks the time is
now. In dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Sandoval v. Rattilin, he said:
Mhis petition presents important issues as to the scope of the requirement, derived
from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that state courts in
civil actions must afford to each litigant a "proper opportunity to present his
evidence" . . . The measure of constitutional protection afforded citizens who are
recipients of free legal services, whether provided by the state or by private charity
is not less than that available to those who pay their own iay. 35 U.S.L Wr~r 3138,
5139 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1966).
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
18. This Note attempts no historical treatment of the rights of the poor in the civil
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teenth Amendment. But Gideon v. Wainwright" leaves a gap between
the right to counsel in criminal and civil cases which dashes with the
very language of the due process clause. "[T]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment extends the protection of due process to property as well as to life
and liberty.. ."-as Justice Roberts (laying the Constitution alongside
the claim) had noted apprehensively in 1942, while restricting the right
to free criminal counsel. 20
It was sensible of the Justice to reason that a general right to counsel
in criminal cases must also affect the civil process. The right to a lawyer
derives from the due process right to a hearing.21 Its rationale was
elaborated by Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence .... He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one .... Without
[counsel], though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his innocence.22
Trying one's own civil case is just as difficult. A civil trial is conducted
under technical rules of evidence and procedure; it demands skill in
marshalling and presenting facts.
The Supreme Court has itself equated civil with criminal cases, en
route to forbidding the states from barring any litigant's hired lawyer
from the court room:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a... court were arbitrarily to
refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it... would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due
process in the constitutional sense.2 3
In delimiting the right to representation by hired counsel, the Court
has said that, inherently, any trial is so complex and involves such high
process. The historical evidence, which, if it is relevant at all, largely favors a due process
right to appointed counsel in civil cases, is set out in a classic article, Maguire, Poveriy
and Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1923).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
21. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
22. Id. at 68-69.
23. Id. at 69. Cf. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 US. 3, 9 (1954).
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stakes that courts must not "indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial."24
But the right of appointment of counsel has been sharply restricted. -
Before Gideon, judges in criminal cases with indigent defendants were
asked to indulge in precisely the sort of "nice calculations" considered
beyond their purview where a litigant had his own lawyer. To limit the
right of appointment, the Court manipulated two factors: the com-
plexity of the trial situation, and the defendant's stake in the proceed-
ings. Against the complexity of each case it set off the defendant's
abilities to master it-his intelligence, youth, experience, etc.20 Further,
the Court took into account what the defendant had to lose; it was
quicker to require a lawyer in capital cases than in trials for lesser
crimes.27
The Court never explicitly justified its different treatment of the
rights of appointment and representation, perhaps because the real
ground of distinction-the fact that a right of appointment costs pub-
lic money while a right of representation gives due process at bargain
prices-was too embarrassing to state. With Gideon, the Court finally
attacked the gap between representation and appointment-at least
in serious criminal cases.28 It extended the Due Process Clause beyond
the requirement that the client be allowed his money's worth of legal
services.
The same extension should follow in the civil area. The Court's
own decisions on the right of representation foreclose any claim that
counsel is inessential in civil trials. It remains only to add that if an
affluent litigant cannot get a fair trial without a lawyer, an indigent
litigant cannot either.
24. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). Glasser was a Sixth Amendment
case but the rationale of the right to counsel is the same under the Sixth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
25. On a possible, though not persuasive, distinction between the right of appointment
and the right of representation, see Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Over-
ruling, in 1963 Sup. Cr. REV. 211,243-45.
26. In right to counsel cases between Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For exhaustive review of these cases, see B]EAzNx, THE
RIGHT TO Couxsx.L IN Az.RICAN Coumas 160-91 (1955).
27. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US. 52, 55 (1961); Bute v. Illinois, 333 US. 640, 674
(1948).
28. But the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases is still in doubt. For the Supreme
Court's latest nonstatement on the issue, see Winters v. Beck (an apparently unreported
Arkansas decision), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WIm 3139 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting to denial of certiorari). Decisions favoring a right to counsel: McDonald v.
Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey v. Misissippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965);
People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413, 207 N.E.2d 358 (1965); Tacoma v.
Heater, 409 P.2d 867 (Wash. 1966). Contra, State v. Bennett, 266 N.C. 755, 147 S.E.2d
237 (1966).
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Equal Protection
Separate rights to counsel for rich and poor may deny equal pro-
tection as well as due process. In Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
held that petitioner's inability to pay for a required trial transcript
could not bar him from taking an appeal, on the principle that "there
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has."' 29 A successor case, Douglas v. California,
required a state to appoint counsel for indigent defendants taking
their first appeal, which was granted as a matter of right.3 0
Griffin and Douglas deal with the rights of indigents in the criminal
process-to that extent they present circumstances more compelling
than do civil cases, where litigants often have less at stake. On the
other hand, Griffin and Douglas guarantee rights on appeal to the
criminal accused-who has already had a trial at which to make his
case-which are denied the civil litigant at trial, before he has had
any hearing at all. The relative importance of criminal appeal and
civil trial in our constitutional scheme is suggested by the reminder in
Griffin that due process does not require the states to have any ap-
pellate system at all.31 It is difficult to imagine the Court holding that
the entire system of civil trial courts is similarly dispensable.
The state cannot and need not equalize the impact on rich and poor
of all its actions and institutions.3 2 But because the establishment of
a forum for enforcing claims and vindicating legal rights is so funda-
mental, the state cannot close that system to any person because of
his relative poverty.
Equal justice, unlike equal privileges on the municipal golf course,33
is a defining condition of citizenship. 34 The Court has recently
recognized that a $1.50 poll tax treats those who cannot pay as
second-class citizens.35 A $50 or $100 cover charge at the courthouse
bears the same message. And when the state provides justice through
an adversary system, which depends for its accuracy and fairness upon
29. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
30. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
31. 351 U.S. 12, at 18, 20-21, reaffirming McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
Commentators have questioned the contemporary vitality of McKane; see Willcox &
Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q.
1, 11 (1957); Note, The Supreme Court 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REv. 62, 108 (1963).
32. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (concurring opinion); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963).
33. Cf. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
34. Wilcox & Bloustein, supra note 31, at 16.
35. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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professional presentation of competing cases, the lawyer's fee is a cost
imposed on the citizen by that system.
The Costs of Counsel
Before the Supreme Court declares a right to counsel in civil cases
the law of the land, it will ask, quite simply: "Can the country afford
it?" So far, at least, legal aid has not been straining our resources. In
a recent year, about two billion dollars were spent in tit-s country on
private legal services, while all of four million were being spent on
legal aid-0.2 per cent.36
Even a full right of counsel should not be prohibitively expensive.
Most of the industrial nations of the world, less wealthy than the
United States, provide free legal services to the poor. Continental
countries have long provided public legal assistance, in some cases since
the First World War.37 Britain has had a statutory legal aid scheme
since 1949.38 Many of these plans supply far more than trial counsel-
aid on civil appeal, legal advice apart from litigation, and the services
of investigators and expert witnesses. 39
While the comparative and internal evidence strongly suggests that
this country can afford a general right to counsel, it does not provide
a reasonably accurate estimate of how much the right would cost.
Such an estimate probably cannot be made at this time. Projection
of foreign figures into the American legal system is not reliable. 0
Nor is it possible to project current American figures into the new
situation created by a constitutional right to counsel; 41 we do not
know how many long-submerged legal problems of the poor will emerge
into litigation with the declaration of a right to counsel.
Public aid, in any of several alternative forms, will have to bear
36. Carlin & Howard, supra note 6, at 410 n.121.
37. Schweinburg, Legal Assistance Abroad, 17 U. Cm. L. Rry. 270, 289-91 (1950); Cf.
United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting opinion).
88. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51. See generally. Utton, The
British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J. 371 (1967).
39. Schweinburg, supra note 37; Utton, supra note 38.
40. For what the figures are worth: Britain, with a Gross National Product about
one-eighth that of the United States, spent about $24,000,000 on its legal aid system in
1964-65. Utton, supra note 58, at 877. Projected on the basis of G.N.P. alone, that gives a
price tag of close to $200,000,000 per year for the United States.
41. Total American expenditure on civil legal aid from priate and public sources,
supra notes 8 and 15, is about $32,000,000 per year. How much this represents of the
money needed to implement the rights argued for in this Note cannot be guessed. The
estimate that ten per cent of the "need" is currently being met, see Carlin & Howard,
supra note 6, at 409-10, is apparently based on pre-OEO figures, hence it probably is
low.
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most of any new burden.4 2 The cost of this aid, while it will be small
in relation to gross figures of public expenditure, is likely to look large
indeed when compared with what Americans are used to spending on
legal assistance.
The Supreme Court, in creating a constitutional right to counsel in
civil cases, will be in effect issuing a mandamus to the legislatures to
appropriate sufficient funds to pay for the right. The Court is likely
to consider carefully the political acceptability of any decision which
will place it in this position.
Because of the uncertainty of the cost, and the possible political
difficulties involved in meeting it, the Supreme Court is unlikely to
create a full-fledged right to counsel for all indigent parties in all civil
cases at one time. Rather it is likely to develop the rights of indigents
in the civil area cautiously, much as it has in the criminal area.
The Path to an Unqualified Right to Appointed Civil Counsel
In establishing expensive criminal procedural safeguards for the
indigent, the Court has developed a warning technique. First there
is a landmark case-a Powell or a Griflin-announcing the new right
in broad terms, on their face applicable to a wide range of poor liti-
gants. However, the actual holding is narrowed to apply only to a
small number of cases. Subsequently, the effective scope of the right
is gradually broadened, while the Court continues to reiterate the
general principles which presage the still broader right which is to
come.4
This technique requires resting points, at which the Court can halt
expansion of the new right, while its implications are digested and
institutions are developed to carry it into effect. A variety of rules can
serve as intermediate stops on the way to a full right to civil counsel.
But not all of these possibilities are equally serviceable.
42. The job is not likely to be done by uncompensated appointment of counsel. This
system, unfair both to clients and lawyers, is under attack in the courts; Dillon v. United
States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964), reversed, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965); Lascher v,
State, 64 Cal. 2d 746, 414 P.2d 398, cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3162 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1966);
State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 412, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966).
43. The process may be traced in cases running from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45(1932) to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), cited in note 27 supra, note 46 infra,
and in BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 26; also in cases following Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (195): Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); and Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). See generally,
Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and its Progeny, 16 STAN, L.
REv. 394 (1964).
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Betts Redivivus: Distinctions Based on Competence and Complexity
Courts may try to limit the scope of a right of civil counsel by resur-
recting the principles developed from Betts v. Brady."4 Under Betts,
two kinds of circumstances were relevant in deciding whether a crim-
inal defendant had a right of appointment: the competence of the
defendant, including his age, intelligence, education, and experience
with the law; and the complexity of the factual and legal issues in
the case.45
The Betts principles have two merits. First, they take into account
the purposes of the right of counsel-protection of the litigant against
being prejudiced by the weak presentation of a complicated case. Sec-
ond, a body of case law interprets the principles. However, examina-
tion of the cases reveals the chief drawback of Belts. It was too vague
a standard to guide reluctant state courts. When the state legislature
lagged in the provision of counsel, the courts tended not to find "spe-
cial circumstances." The Supreme Court's only recourse was to indi-
cate that the circumstances of the case before them were indeed "spe-
cial," and to reverse.46 When the Court tried to push the test in the
direction of requiring counsel in more and more cases, as Justice Har-
lan remarked, "This evolution . . . appears not to have been fully
recognized by many state courts .... ,,47
The "troubled journey"48 of the special circumstances standard
should discourage the Supreme Court from starting a second trip.
The Type of Civil Case: Rules Based on the Importance of the Interest
at Stake
British legal aid excludes from its coverage actions involving injury
to reputation: defamation, breach of promise to marry, and entice-
ment of spouse. 49 A widespread policy among Legal Aid Societies in
this country is not to provide counsel for divorce actions.50
Policies like this reflect the judgment that some civil actions are
luxuries, less needful of subsidy than others. These judgments are no
44. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
45. See BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 160-91.
46. See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Uveges v. Pennsy'1vania. 335
U.S. 437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Rice v. Olson, 324 US. 786 (1945).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 351 (1963).
48. Id. at 350.
49. Dworkin, The Progress and Future of Legal Aid in Civil Litigation, 28 MoD. L. Rm.
432, 445 (1965).
50. Carlin & Howard, supra note 6, at 413-15.
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doubt partly paternalistic or moralistic but insofar as they have a
stronger basis, it is that less is at stake in the "luxury" actions. To this
extent, these judgments parallel the distinction between capital and
noncapital crimes, between felonies and misdemeanors, and between
criminal and civil cases. They are subject to the same objections as
those distinctions-that they make the poor man put a greater interest
at stake, before he has counsel as of right, than a rich man must. This
in itself is no conclusive objection; it applies to any distinction de-
signed as an expedient limitation on the right of appointment of
counsel.
Apart from this objection of principle, it is difficult to distinguish
between kinds of civil actions on the basis of the "importance" of the
interest at stake in them. In the largest class of civil cases, what is at stake
on both sides is money, or property of definite economic value. Pre-
sumably the only line which could be drawn within this area would set
a minimum on the financial stake which would compel appointment
of counsel. Any such criterion ignores the crucial factor of relative
poverty; to a very poor man, fifty dollars may make a great deal of
difference. 51
A constitutional argument might be mounted that only civil cases
involving "property" give rise to the right of counsel, appealing to the
language of the Due Process Clause.52 It is hard to take such an argu-
ment seriously-would due process not be violated if one party were
denied the right of representation by employed counsel in a divorce
case?53
Other arguments excluding non-property interests as too "unim-
portant" rest on value judgments far more subjective than those un-
derlying the rejected distinction between capital and noncapital
crimes.5 4 Is the interest at stake in a divorce-freedom to remarry-
more or less important than the interest in property? What shall the
courts say of the interest protected by defamation suits--the interest in
reputation? As the questions multiply, the distinctions fade.
51. In some jurisdictions this problem is dealt with, in theory, by the provision of
small claims courts. On the practical weaknesses of small claims courts as forums for the
poor, see Carlin 8: Howard, supra note 6, at 421-23; WALD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 62-64.
52. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
53. For the argument that the term "property" in the Due Process Clause should be
construed to mean "all legal interests," see Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due
Process," 49 CALIF. L. REv. 215, 218 (1961).
54. See Mr. Justice Clark concurring in Gideon: "[The] distinction between capital and
noncapital cases ... [is] a value judgment not universally accepted." 372 U.S. 35, 349
(1963).
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Plaintiff-Defendant: Distinctions Based on Voluntariness
A major talking point of those who oppose expansion of the legal
rights of the poor is the spectre of a flood of frivolous and harassing
lawsuits by the poor.55 A simple way to appease this fear would be
to grant the right only to civil defendants, letting indigent would-be
plaintiffs get along on private legal aid and contingent fee arrange-
ments.
The rhetorical key to the plaintiff-defendant distinction is the
phrase "haled into court," as used, for instance, by the Supreme Court
in Gideon v. Wainwright: "[A]ny person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him."56 Behind this rhetoric is no doubt some sense that
one who finds himself brought into court, against his will, to have
some civil interest threatened, is more deserving of sympathy (and a
lawyer), than one who chooses to come to court with a claim.
But the plaintiff-defendant distinction is, in essence, arbitrary. Sup-
pose Burt pays money to Harry, and a dispute arises over whether the
payment is a loan to Harry or the discharge of a previous obligation
of Burt's. Under the plaintiff-defendant distinction, impecunious Burt
cannot get a lawyer to sue Harry for the money, thus Harry wins the
dispute by default. If Burt had not made the payment, it would have
been Harry who was financially barred from having a fair hearing
on his claim. The outcome of legal disputes should not have to de-
pend on such fortuities.
Or consider Mr. and Mrs. Kramden, indigents, who do not get
along. It will be in the interest of each to try and goad the other into
first filing divorce papers; the winner in this war of nerves will emerge
with a lawyer, while the loser gets none, under the plaintiff-defendant
distinction.
The procedural alignment of a dispute into "plaintiff" and "de-
fendant" has little to do with the voluntariness or deserts of the parties.
A better way should be found of discouraging frivolous or harassing
litigation.
55. See Moore v. Cooley, 2 Hill 412, 413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842): "Tjhe pauper comes to
litigate entirely at the expense of others. .. . He thus enjoys a great privilege and
exemption from the common lot of men, whereby... he becomes, as Lord Bacon says
rather able to vex than unable to sue." For more contemporary expression of the same
concern, see Hamley, The Impact of Griffin v. Illinois on State Court-Federal Court
Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75, 80-81 (1958); Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. Cau. L REv. 143,
149 (1957).
56. 372 U.S. 335, 344.
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The Public Plaintiff: Distinctions Based on the Role of the State in the
Case
Among the clearest cases of injustice in the civil process are those
in which the state brings suit against an indigent and unrepresented
defendant-whether in its role as tax-collector, condemnor of prop-
erty, landlord, or parens patriae. The defendant, unable because of
his poverty to present his case properly, is overborne by lawyers and
other litigative resources paid for out of the public treasury.
The striking unfairness of such proceedings might tempt a court
to hold, as an initial step toward a general right of appointed civil
counsel, that a lawyer must be appointed for an indigent defendant
only against a public plaintiff.
Such a limitation on the right of civil counsel would have practical
advantages. It would give the state the power, which it now has in
the criminal field, to limit the pressure upon local legal aid resources
by reducing the number of suits it brings against poor defendants.
No such power exists when counsel must be appointed in civil suits
between private parties.
But there are both common sense and doctrinal objections to the
"public plaintiff" rule. First, in considering the case from the point of
view of the poor defendant, a judge will be hard put to find him more
unfairly treated when his opponent is the state than when it is a pri-
vate party, equally well supplied with counsel and other litigative
services. Second, the rule would presumably be based on the state
action doctrine-and it would be bad constitutional law to hold that
no state action is present unless the state is a party to the suit.57 The
"public plaintiff" rule, if framed as a constitutional doctrine, would
implicitly deny that the state "acts" in the Fourteenth Amendment
sense when it establishes its system for settling private disputes.
Statutory Manipulation: Distinctions Between State and Federal Courts
A familiar device for warning the states of the onset of a costly
constitutional obligation is the initial imposition of that obligation on
the federal government alone. An example of such a warning is the
Supreme Court's development of the right of appointment of counsel
for criminal defendants. The right was declared, though applied under
57. See, for contemporary interpretation of "state action," Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 PA. L. Rav. 473 (1962); S1ard,
A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the 'State Action' Limit on the Equal Protection
Guarantee, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 855 (1966).
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the Sixth Amendment only in the federal courts, in the case of Johnson
v. Zerbst.58 Not until twenty-five years later did the Court extend the
full right to the states by incorporating it in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.59
No such two-step is possible with the right to civil counsel, for the
constitutional provisions which support the right apply equally to the
states and the federal government. However, there remains the tech-
nique of creating a right to appointed civil counsel in the federal courts
by means of a constitutionally "influenced" reinterpretation of a
federal statute.
An appropriate statute is available: 28 U.S.C. § 1915,co which autho-
rizes federal courts to allow civil litigants, as well as criminal appellants,
to proceed in forma pauperis if they are ". . . unable to pay.., costs or
give security therefor," and which further provides that "[t]he court
may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ
counsel...."
The provisions that a court "may" waive payment of costs and "may"
supply a litigant with counsel appear to grant the trial judge broad
discretion; the statute itself provides no standards for the exercise of
that discretion. However, the Supreme Court, interpreting these
phrases as they apply to criminal appeals, has shown how apparently
permissive and discretionary statutory language can, under the in-
fluence of constitutional doctrine, be stretched to require a right to
appeal in forma pauperis and a right of appointed counsel.
The constitutional influence was Griffin v. IllinoisO in 1956, which
required the states to provide in forma pauperis appeals to all indigents
convicted of crime. A year after Griffin, the Court decided that when
a trial court certified that an appeal was not taken in good faith (and
thus could not be pursued in forma pauperis), such certification could
be appealed, and counsel must be appointed by the appellate court to
argue the issue of good faith.12 Second, the Court held that all appeals
were, as a matter of law, taken "in good faith" unless they were so
frivolous as to be subject to dismissal by a judge sza sponte under
Federal Criminal Rule 39(a). 3 Finally, the Court held that where an
58. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
59. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963).
60. 27 Stat. 252 (1892), 28 US.C. § 1915 (1964).
61. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62. Johnson v. United States, 352 US. 565, 566 (1957).
63. Ellis v. United States, 356 US. 674 (1958).
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in forma pauperis appeal was allowed, counsel should be appointed to
argue the appeal on the merits. 64
The Court explained, quite unnecessarily, that this tour de force of
statutory interpretation had been
*.. impelled by considerations beyond the corners of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, considerations that it is our duty to assure to the greatest
degree possible, within the statutory framework for appeals created
by Congress, equal treatment for every litigant before the bar.0
Similar interpretive work could be done with the provisions that
courts "may" permit civil cases to proceed in forma pauperis, and
"may" appoint lawyers for litigants who cannot afford to pay for them.
The Court clearly has the power to set standards for the exercise of
discretion by trial courts in making the judgments called for. It could
hold that federal courts must grant counsel and waiver of costs, except
when certain specified circumstances are present, and it could accom-
pany this holding by a version of its statement that it was "impelled"
by considerations of "equal treatment for every litigant before the
bar." 6
Costs and Counsel: Distinctions Between Access to the Courts and
Effective Use of Them
A final signalling device could be the declaration of a constitutional
right of free access to the courts. All civil courts require plaintiffs, and
usually defendants as well, to pay certain court fees, and to post bond
which will cover costs in the event that they lose the case. 7 These fees
and costs often prevent the poor from having any hearing at all on the
merits of their case.
This barrier is arguably a worse discrimination against the poor than
the failure to provide counsel. If the indigent litigant can get into
court, he has at least some chance of convincing a judge or jury of the
merit of his case or defense, even if he has no lawyer to put his case for
him. Where he cannot even gain access to the court, he has no chance
at all.
64. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962).
65. Id. at 446-47.
66. In doing so, the Court would not have to depart from its own precedents; It has
ruled on appointment of civil counsel under § 1915 only once, and there to relax the
standard of indigency applied. Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours t, Co., 335 U.S. 31
(1948).
67. A ,rcAN BAR FOUNDATION, PUBLIC PROVISION FOR COSTS AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL
LGATION 1-7, 91-100 (tentative draft, 1966).
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The distinction has the practical merit that the states are institu-
tionally better prepared to waive fees and costs for the poor than they
are to provide free counsel. Most states now have civil in forma
pauperis laws; 68 those which do not could easily enact them without
the strain that might be caused by trying to find enough lawyers to
represent all indigent civil litigants.
This no-fees approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in develop-
ing the rights of the poor in criminal appeals. The Griffin case and its
immediate successors guaranteed a right of access; only seven years
later with Douglas v. California0 did the Court reach out to require
appointment of counsel. The distinction may serve a useful warning
function, but ultimately it is a fragile one. The right to bring or defend
a lawsuit without an accompanying right of counsel is, in most cases,
hollow. A realistic court could not long reconcile granting a right of
access to the courts with denial of the rights which make access effec-
tive.71
Administration of Appointment of Civil Counsel7'
If the Supreme Court declares a right to civil counsel, the states will
take care to prevent assignment of counsel in frivolous cases. The courts
will have to review these screening systems for violations of the due
process and equal protection rights of the applicants. Both substantive
conditions and procedural arrangements will pose constitutional prob-
lems.
Substantive Standard
Why should any screening for legal merit be allowed at all? The rich
man does not have to make any showing of a good case to get an
appointment with a lawyer. And in Douglas, the Supreme Court held
68. Id. at 3.
69. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The access-counsel distinction is discussed in Comment, 55
MiCH. L. R1v. 413, 420 (1957).
70. Justice Jackson: "'[R]ights' are worth, when they are threatened, just what some
lawyer makes them worth." The County Seat Lawyer, 36 A.B.AJ. 497 (1950).
71. To administer a right to appointed dvil counsel, courts must establish a standard
for determining to whom the right applies. The problem exists as well in the field of
criminal right to counsel, and this Note does not deal with it. One possible standard has
been suggested by the Allen Committee:
[P]overty must be viewed as a relative concept.... A problem of poverty arises for
the system of criminal justice when at any stage of the proceedings lack of means in
the accused substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a right or a
claim of right.
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S Comsi-rr., PovERTY AND THE AD.NtLsml 'oN oF FEannML Cn!LnNAL
JusTicE 7-8 (1963).
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that an indigent defendant could not be required to "run this gauntlet
of a preliminary showing of merit."' 2
Here a distinction can be made between the civil and criminal
spheres. A man who visits a lawyer on a civil matter may have a view to
possible litigation; on the other hand, he may desire some other service
-the drafting of a will, or merely some advice. It is certainly arguable
that there is a general right of the poor to have legal advice for free, but
such an argument goes beyond the narrower one made here: that the
right to use the courts, to litigate, is so fundamental that a state must
make it equally available to all.
One possible threshold might be called a "cause of action" standard:
if the applicant can state facts which constitute a cause of action or a
defense legally sufficient for him to proceed to litigation, he should
have counsel appointed to represent him.
Such a standard finds a precedent in the Supreme Court's test for
in forma pauperis appeals of criminal convictions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. The Court has required that such appeals be allowed (and thus
that counsel be appointed) if the defendant can state a ground of appeal
which would prevent sua sponte dismissal by an appellate court if the
appeal had been brought by a non-indigent party.73
Given a goal of rough equality of litigative services between rich and
poor, the "cause of action" standard is appropriate to the criminal
appellate process. A convicted defendant who is told by his lawyer that
he has a ground for appeal is likely to spend his last cent pressing the
case.74 But a stronger test than "cause of action" may be permissible in
the civil area, where financial factors do play a large part in the decisions
of non-indigent persons to drop or to press a case. Almost no one is so
extravagantly litigious that he will enter a lawsuit on the bare advice of
counsel that he can state a legally sufficient cause of action or defense.
The application of the "cause of action" standard to the right of civil
counsel might place the poor in a better position than those who must
72. 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). The problem need not arise if the right to civil counselis based on the Due Process Clause, which traditionally guarantees only a milnimum
standard of fairness. The guarantee of substantially equal services to rich and poor is an
equal protection requirement, stemming from Griffin, and particularly from Douglas.
73. See note 63 supra.
74. Cf. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 nA (1963):
The state also argues that in practical effect there is no difference at all between
the rights it affords indigents and nonindigents, because a moneyed defendant,
motivated by a "sense of thrift," will choose not to appeal in exactly the same
circumstances that an indigent will be denied a transcript. We reject this contention
as untenable. It defies common sense to think that a moneyed defendant faced withlong term imprisonment and advised by Counsel that he has substantial groundsfor appeal ... will choose not to appeal merely to save the cost of a transcript.
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hire their lawyer; that far the states may not have to go. The standard
applied by the British Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949 may be the
best one available. In Britain, a committee of attorneys judges whether:
. . a man of moderate means (sufficient to afford the costs of
litigation but not in a position to waste money) would embark on
litigation relying on his own means; whether, in effect, it would
be "reasonable business" to take action35
The standard has the drawback of vagueness, which may encourage
lax administration by state courts. Unfortunately it is difficult to formu-
late any standard less stringent than the "cause of action" test which
does not raise the same problem. Some of the difficulties of enforcement
can be met by requiring that fair procedures be followed in the decision
to grant or deny counsel; others must be overcome by the Court's
embellishing the "private client" test with a body of case law.
Procedure
The procedure for administering the standard of merit imposed on
applications for counsel must avoid two unconstitutional extremes. It
must not be so informal as to afford no opportunity for review-im-
portant constitutional rights cannot be granted or withheld by officials
exercising unfettered discretion.76 On the other hand it must not be so
formal and complex as to replace, in effect, the trial which the applicant
for counsel is seeking.77
These two extremes suggest the ground rules for an acceptable proce-
dure. It might make use of a frontline screening agency, whether a
judge, a private lawyer operating under a scheme of state reimburse-
ments, an official or private legal aid agency, or a public or private
referral service. If the agency should decide that the applicant's case
did not merit the appointment of counsel, it would inform him of that
decision, and that he had a right to a hearing if he wished to challenge
it.
The hearing itself should be an informal ex parte proceeding, either
before a judge or a quasi-judicial administrative board. The applicant
should be allowed and encouraged to tell his story in his own way,
without any strict standards of relevancy or other rules of evidence
being applied. Presumably he could be placed under oath, and the
75. SACGS, Legal Aid 82 (1951).
76. Lane v. Brown, 572 U.S. 477,485 (concurring opinion) (1963).
77. Cf. McKenna, Judicial Safeguards of the Rights of Indigent Defendants, 41 Nora
DA-& Lmw. 982, 993 (1966).
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hearing officers could be allowed to question him. A record should be
kept of the hearing, and a finding of fact and a reasoned decision should
be written by the judge or the board. If the hearing is administrative, it
should be subject to judicial review.
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